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Abstract 
This article analyses the politics of copyright and copying. Copyright is an 
increasingly important driver of the modern economy, but this does not exhaust 
its significance. It matters, we argue, not just for the distribution of rewards and 
resources in the creative industries, but as a site within which established 
political concerns – collective and individual interests and identities - are 
articulated and negotiated, and within which notions of ‘originality’, ‘creativity’ 
and ‘copying’ are politically constituted.  Set against the background of the 
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increasing economic value attributed to the creative industries, the impact of 
digitalization on them, and the European Union’s Digital Single Market strategy, 
the article reveals how copyright policy, and the underlying assumptions about 
‘copying’ and ‘creativity’, express (often unexamined) political values and 
ideologies. Drawing on a close reading of policy statements, official reports, court 
cases, and interviews with stakeholders, we explore the multiple political aspects 
of copyright, showing how copyright policy operates to privilege particular 
interests and practices, and to acknowledge only specific forms of creative 
endeavour. 
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Introduction 
Our argument is that copyright and copyright policy, typically the province of 
intellectual property lawyers, warrants the closer scrutiny of political scientists, 
because copyright affects the distribution of resources and rewards and because 
it manages the tension between collective and individual rights.  How these 
matters are resolved is important materially and culturally for all societies, and 
their resolution is a consequence of political processes and political values. But 
there is, we suggest, more at stake than this. Copyright also serves to construct 
ideas of ‘creativity’, ‘originality’ and ‘copying’. These are ideas that matter 
profoundly to the vision of the liberal society and the individuals who constitute 
it. As John Stuart Mill (1972/1859: 132) wrote in ‘On Liberty’: ‘It will not be 
denied by anybody, that originality is a valuable element in human affairs.’  In 
this article, we unpack the political principles and judgements that constitute 
copyright and copyright policy, revealing both how they affect the distribution of 
resources and opportunities, but also how they construct modern 
understandings of originality and creativity.     
According to the Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS, 2015), 
in 2014 the creative industries were worth £76.9bn to the UK economy; their 
exports were valued at £17.3bn; and they provided 1.71m jobs. These industries 
– music, film, television, video games, among others – are heavily dependent on 
copyright in realizing their economic worth. The music business in particular, 
according to Patrik Wikstrom (2009: 12), is to be understood as a ‘copyright 
industry’. Indeed, the body that represents that industry, UK Music, describes 
copyright as the ‘currency of creativity’ (UK Music, 2010) and as ‘the bedrock of 
the music industry’ (UK Music, 2014).  
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Digitalisation has heightened the importance of copyright, facilitating 
piracy and illegal file-sharing, and impacting on almost all aspects of the 
production, distribution and consumption of creative content. These 
transformations drive the EU’s determination to create a Digital Single Market 
(DSM), and to engage in a radical overhaul of the copyright regime (European 
Commission, 2015; Rosati, 2013).1 They also lie behind national initiatives to 
adapt to digitalisation2, and the concomitant need to reform copyright 
(Hargreaves, 2011). These reform programmes have attracted intense political 
lobbying in Brussels and elsewhere by the corporate stakeholders and those 
suspicious of their motives (for example, the Open Rights Society, the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation and European Digital Rights [EDRi]). The EU’s consultation 
on copyright attracted 9,500 replies and more than 11,000 messages (Dobusch, 
2014).   
This heightened attention on copyright is reflected in electoral agendas. 
In the 2015 UK General Election, the Conservative (2015: 42) and the Liberal 
Democrat (2015: 37) parties both referred to copyright in their manifestos.3  The 
Green Party called for ‘a comprehensive Digital Bill of Rights’, with the intention 
of reducing the role of the market in cultural production and consumption 
(Green Party, 2015: 61).  And while the Pirate Party, formed specifically to 
reform copyright, may no longer be the force in Europe that it once was 
                                                        
1 The UK’s decision to leave the EU is unlikely to affect significantly its copyright 
law, although it will cease to be subject to subsequent interpretations of that law 
by the CJEU.  
2 See, for example, ‘The UK’s Vision for a Digital Europe’; available at:  
https://engage.number10.gov.uk/digital-single-market/uk-vision-for-eu-digital-
economy-single-market.pdf. 
3 The Labour Party, the SNP and UKIP, however, made no mention of copyright. 
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(Cammaerts, 2015; Fredriksson, 2014), its sole representative in the European 
parliament, Julia Reda, is the official rapporteur for the EU’s copyright 
consultation exercise (Reda, 2015).   
 Despite its increasing political salience, copyright has tended to be 
overlooked by disciplines other than law.4 In particular, political studies has 
been slow to acknowledge its significance, although it is important to note the 
contribution of work by Jeremy Waldron (1993) on the political theory of 
copyright, Ronald Bettig (1996) on the political economy of intellectual property, 
Jessica Litman (2006) on the making of US copyright policy, and Debora Halbert 
(2014) and Blayne Haggart (2014) on the global politics of the international 
copyright regime. This article is a further sortie into this field. We explore the 
political ideas that inform both copyright policy and constitute the underlying 
practices of copying and creativity. We concentrate on the music industry, and 
we analyse how political values and assumptions underpin, first, existing 
copyright regimes, and we examine how political judgements inform ideas of  a 
‘work’ that may be ‘a copy’ or an ‘original’ and attribute responsibility to an 
‘author’. In making our case, we draw on policy documents, legal cases and 
interviews with key actors in the music industry. We show how copyright policy 
arbitrates between the claims of individuals and those of society, and how it 
assigns responsibility and agency.  In these respects, it is political in the sense 
adopted by David Runciman (2014: 6): ‘the collective choices that bind groups of 
people to live in a particular way’. But it also acts politically in defining 
                                                        
4 For exceptions: in history, see Baldwin, 2014, Cummings, 2013 and Johns, 
2010; in music studies, see Frith and Marshall, 2004 and McLeod and DiCola, 
2011; in cultural studies, see Decherney, 2013 and Gaines, 1991; in sociology, see 
van Eechoud, 2014. 
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‘originality’ and ‘creativity’, and in determining integrity and cultural value in 
forms of communication.  
 
Background: copyright and digitalisation 
Copyright policy is designed to reward and incentivize creators, and to enable 
society to benefit from the results of their innovation and creativity in the public 
domain. It does this by identifying the rights of creators and intermediaries to 
benefit from their contributions.5  And in recognizing and regulating these rights 
it establishes what may be claimed as an original work and what a copy, where 
copying may refer to either the reproduction of a work for commercial purposes 
or to the plagiarizing of artistic expression.  
Both forms of copying have been affected by digitalisation. Arguably the 
music industry has felt these effects most sharply (Negus, 2015). The recording 
of music in digital form (as opposed to analogue) has meant that it becomes 
possible for copies to be made with no loss of quality; it has also meant that 
music could be ‘shared’ much more rapidly than was possible with analogue 
media such as cassette tapes (and even with copied digital CDs). Within the 
legitimate market, digitalisation has made possible internet radio and streaming 
services which introduce new possibilities and problems for the licensing of 
music and for rights collection. Digitalisation has also extended the creative 
possibilities available to artists, making the sampling of music a great deal easier 
and more sophisticated, expanding what it is possible to deliver in a live 
                                                        
5 The cast list is long, but includes composers, performers, record labels, and 
publishers.  
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performance,  and facilitating new forms of collaboration and integration within, 
and between, cultural forms and media platforms (Vermallis and Herzog, 2015).   
As with any such technological change, there is a danger of exaggerating 
the extent of its effects. Illegal copying was an issue before digitalisation and 
before the internet, hence the music industry’s campaign for blank tape levies in 
the 1980s (Knopper, 2009). Sampling was possible with analogue tape and a 
razor blade. And there have always been those who contend that copyright is the 
problem for, rather than the solution to, enhancing creativity (Boldrin and 
Levine, 2008; Lessig, 2005; McLeod and DiCola, 2011).  But even if digitalisation 
merely exacerbates the problems of copying, there remains the question of when 
and how copying is deemed acceptable or unacceptable practice. Copying has 
always been a feature of cultural practice (Heylin, 2015; Levine, 2014).  As 
Jessica Litman (1990: 965; her emphasis) writes: ‘… the very act of authorship in 
any medium is more akin to translation and recombination than it is to creating 
Aphrodite from the foam of the sea’. Copyright, therefore, is not about originals 
versus copies, so much as discerning ‘good’ from ‘bad’ copying, and in 
determining what is ‘fair’ for the parties involved.   
 
Constituting copyright: political principles and political interests 
Copyright itself is one element of the more general regulation of knowledge and 
its creation. The particular form it takes is, in a large part, a matter of historical 
contingency. Nonetheless, the need for such regulation, and the debates about 
what form it should take, are informed by both political interests and political 
principles.  
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In the music industry, competing interests have been most vividly 
revealed in controversies over the royalty payments accruing from the streaming 
services such as Spotify, Deezer and Apple Music (Seabrook, 2014; Cooke, 2015). 
Artists have complained that multiple streams of their work have generated a 
pittance in royalties6, and have acted to challenge the existing system by creating 
new services (such as Tidal), by withdrawing their catalogue (as Taylor Swift did 
with Spotify) or by advocating legislative or regulatory change (Dredge, 2015; 
Linshi, 2014; H.R. 1283 – 114th Congress and Ne-Yo, 2015; Williamson, 2015). 
These skirmishes have taken place against a backdrop in which copyright, 
according to Alex Cummings, (2013: 3-4), is increasingly allied to corporate 
strategy: ‘the shift from a hands-off cultural policy that emphasized free 
competition (copy and compete) to a more aggressive stance that protected 
capital investment in the name of economic growth.’ The result, according to US 
critics (Boyle, 2010; Gillespie, 2007; Herman, 2013), has been a victory for 
vested corporate interests and a more restricted cultural space. Whatever the 
outcome, these struggles have been couched in terms of competing political 
principles (Toynbee, 2006).  
Copyright is typically understood as an attempt to balance the rights of 
individual creators against those of the wider society to enjoy the benefits 
afforded by common creative culture. This is as true for those, like the Pirate 
Party, who challenge the copyright regime, as it is for those who endorse its 
current form.  One of the founding principles of the US Constitution is: ‘To 
                                                        
6 The writer of a song that had been streamed 178 million times claimed that he 
received £3700 only (Butterfly, 2015; see also Byrne, 2013). Others have 
suggested that rewards from streaming are not out of line with standard 
industry practice (Marshall, 2015). 
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promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
their Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.’ (Art. 1, Sec. 8, Clause 8) In the same spirit, the UN Declaration of 
Human Rights states: ‘(1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the 
cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific 
advancement and its benefits. (2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the 
moral and material interests resulting from scientific, literary or artistic 
production of which he is the author.’ (Article 27)  These general statements of 
principle take more specific form in the Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Rights (1886), which establishes how and where these 
rights apply, and continue to find expression in such policies as the EU’s 
Information Society Directive (Recitals 10 & 11, 2001/29/EC).  
 Encoded within these balancing principles are further claims, based 
either on the Lockean property or natural rights of individual creators, or on 
some notion of collective, utilitarian welfare benefit (Stokes, 2003: 10-19). These 
are not, though, discrete alternatives. As Waldron (1993) notes, artists depend 
on others, whether in the form of prior creative work and traditions, or in the 
form of infrastructural support. The rights claimed do not derive only from the 
labour theory of value, but from ideas of personal integrity and rights of 
communication, which lead to the suggestion that artists should be seen as 
‘creators’, rather than just ‘proprietors’ (Barron, 2006; Biron, 2014).  
  The way that political regimes resolve the tension between these 
conflicting approaches might be seen to exemplify these multiple considerations. 
Hence, in China the collectivist principle holds sway in the insistence that 
copyright protection is directly linked ‘to the building of a socialist society that is 
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advanced ethically and materially, and promoting the progress of and flourishing 
of socialist cultures and sciences’ (Copyright Law of the PRC, Art. 1). While in 
liberal political regimes, there are variations between those that recognize the 
artist’s ‘moral rights’ (as contained in the Berne Convention) to determine how 
their work might be used, and those that do not.7 Other variations include the so-
called ‘parody exception’ – the right to use existing works to mock or satirize – 
that is recognized in some jurisdictions, but not others.  This is not a matter of 
technical detail, but of expressive freedom (Jacques, 2015).  
 Copyright as a property claim co-exists with copyright as an integrity 
claim or a claim to freedom of expression (Lee, 2015). Which principle is 
privileged has consequences for - to repeat Runciman’s definition of politics - 
‘the collective choices that bind groups of people to live in a particular way’.  As 
Alina Ng (2008: 424-25) explains:  ‘Shifting the ethics for copyright from a 
utilitarian-based approach, which justifies property rights as necessary to 
further larger public goals, towards a natural rights framework, which justifies 
the grant of rights as natural entitlements, allows authorial and social rights in 
literary and artistic works to be allocated on principles of fairness and justice.’  
Copyright policy does not seek to resolve only the tension between the 
individual and the collective, but to define what constitutes the making of a 
creative or original contribution. 
                                                        
7 This right is typically difficult to assert, especially in the U.S., which has applied 
a comparatively narrow interpretation of the Berne convention and where a 
patchwork of federal and state provisions applies without explicit codification 
for ‘moral rights’ pertaining to music. Musicians’ objections to the use of their 
music, for example by politicians, typically take the form of public disavowals (as 
with Neil Young and Adele against Donald Trump), or (as with Jackson Browne 
and John McCain) appeals to the property provisions of copyright and other IP 
codes. 
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 These complex issues can be played out on the global stage. China’s recent 
reform of its copyright regime, for example, while still framed by collectivist 
principles, has been driven by an imperative to comply with the rather different 
principles and values of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) and The Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights  (TRIPS) protocols (Halbert, 2014; Street 
et al., 2015). In a similar way, the European Union has been seeking to 
harmonize its copyright regime in order to create the conditions for the digital 
single market. This too has revealed competing priorities, embodied in division 
between the Commission and the Parliament. Where the former has justified 
policy reform in terms of the commercial value to be realized, the latter has been 
more concerned with copyright’s cultural contribution. These are not mere 
differences of emphasis, but of principle and impact (Dietz, 2014).   
The resolution of these conflicts matters to the material interests of 
creators, corporations and consumers, as well as to the character of the wider 
culture (Burkart, 2010; Hesmondhalgh et al, 2015: 113-21; Kretschmer, 2016).  
It also engenders debates about the need for (and value of) copyright. Those who 
seek its abolition contend that copyright is not relevant as a source of revenue to 
those who are its intended beneficiaries (typically, musicians, rather than, say, 
fans): ‘If we were to abolish copyright today, we are confident that the most 
important effect would be a vast increase in the quantity and quality of music 
available’ (Boldrin and Levine, 2008: 106). Others of a similar inclination refuse 
to acknowledge the founding tenets of the dominant account of copyright: 
‘Copyright infringement is not theft because copyright is not a kind of property 
capable of being stolen. Copyright is a limited set of rights that gives the owner 
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the ability to prevent the public from making some uses of creative material for 
some length of time’ (Malcolm, 2014: np). For these critics, copyright is to be 
explained rather than justified, and the explanation is to be found in the material 
interests of corporate players, and in the capitalist system that they inhabit 
(Stahl, 2013).  
There are other critics who, while they do not seek the abolition of 
copyright, argue that there is a mis-match between the policy and the actual 
practice of contemporary artists, and as a result copyright fails to sustain a 
culture of creativity. The extension of the term of copyright protection, for 
example, has been argued to break with the US Constitution’s commitment to 
culture accessible to all (Laing, 2004). It has also been suggested that copyright 
policy enshrines a particular European, fine art tradition, in which creativity 
resides with the work of a solitary genius (Butt, 2015; Rosen, 2008: 4-5). Such an 
ideal is at odds with the collective working practices of musicians (and indeed of 
almost all art) (Bently, 2009; Firth, 2015). For similar reasons, rights are 
ascribed to the melody and words of a song, but not the arrangement, the 
rhythmic patterns or the other sonic features contributed by the accompanying 
musicians. Copyright law, to this extent, privileges particular kinds of musical 
expression, and fails to protect other forms. Olufunmilayo Arewa (2006 and 
2011) has sought to show how the law can be used to close down creativity (in 
particular, in the use of music samples). ‘Copyright frameworks that reflect a 
broader range of musical practice’, argues Arewa (2011: 1846), ‘will facilitate 
creations by innovative musicians who might otherwise be dissuaded from 
borrowing to create music because of copyright conceptions that do not 
encompass their particular forms of creativity.’  
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In summary, we have argued so far that political values and principles are 
implicated in copyright policy, and that these give rise to conflicts that matter 
both materially and culturally. This does not exhaust the politics of copyright, if 
only because of the very general, underdetermined nature of the principles 
involved.  Underlying the politics of copyright policy, and the broad political 
principles that provides its rationale, are the politics of copying.  Here the 
argument is about what is meant by, and valuable in, ‘originality’ and ‘creativity’. 
These are terms that have often been overlooked by politics scholars, but which 
appeal to, and depend upon, political judgements and which feed into wider 
understandings of liberal individuality.   
 
From the politics of copyright to the politics of copying  
Copyright is intended to protect the ‘original’ and to weed out the ‘unauthorized 
copy’. As such, it is political in the sense that it affects the distribution of 
resources and establishes rules of collective behaviour. But the politics do not 
end there; they extend to how ‘originality’ is understood (Rahmatian, 2011).  
What counts as ‘original’, as Marcus Boon (2010: 49) argues, is ‘not an objective 
fact but a historically specific style of presentation.’ In what follows, we explore 
how, in the implementation of copyright policy, courts construct ‘historically 
specific’ notions of creativity and originality that are themselves politically 
inflected.  ‘[C]ourts play an important role,’ writes Arewa (2006: 641), ‘in helping 
to determine the shape and nature of acceptable cultural production.’    
We begin with one of the most high-profile of recent cases, that involving 
the song ‘Blurred Lines’. In 2015, those acting on behalf of the singer Marvin 
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Gaye sued Pharrell Williams and Robin Thicke, the composers of ‘Blurred Lines’ 
(2013), for infringement of copyright (Williams et al vs Bridgeport Music, Inc. 
Case number: 2:13-cv-06004). ‘Blurred Lines’, it was claimed, copied Gaye’s song 
‘Got to Give It Up’ (1977).  The ruling, delivered in 2015, went in favour of Gaye, 
and the composers of ‘Blurred Lines’ were ordered to pay $7.4m in 
compensation.8   
While the court’s decision might seem to be just another case of 
plagiarism punished, much more was entailed. First, there was the question of 
what exactly was being protected by copyright and what was being copied. The 
musicologists who appeared for the prosecution, consultant Judith Finell and 
Harvard ethnomusicologist Ingrid Monson, claimed that there was ‘a 
constellation of similarities’ between the two songs which could be specifically 
identified. These ‘similarities’ were, however, contested by other experts, who 
argued that, in respect of those elements of the song that are most commonly 
used to claim protection by copyright in court (the lyrics and the melody), the 
two songs had virtually nothing in common. Typical of this position was the 
musicologist Joe Bennett (2014), who contended that the two songs were 
different in the beats per minute, the instrumentation, the lyrics, the melodies, 
the chord patterns, and the key. Bennett, like a number of other critics, argued 
that all the songs had in common were a ‘feel’ and ‘groove’, and that applying 
copyright to these would be to risk making a ‘genre’ the subject of copyright, and 
hence to harm profoundly a culture of musical creativity. 
                                                        
8 The compensation was reduced to $5.3m in July 2015, and in December 2015 
Williams et al filed an appeal (CA No. 15-56880). 
  
. 
 15 
Other musicologists refused this stark dichotomy between plagiarism and 
originality. Robert Fink (2015), for instance, insisted that it was necessary to 
look beyond any ‘surface coincidences’ and to demonstrate how the songs ‘at a 
deeper level’ contained ‘melodic, harmonic, and rhythmic’ similarities. Fink 
(2015, np; his emphasis) argued:  
One of the incorrect lessons observers are drawing from this verdict is 
that it means you can be sued for copying the ‘feel’ or ‘vibe’ of an existing 
song. Nothing could be further from the truth. The argument was 
ostensively made, and ostensively accepted by the jury, only on the basis 
of similarities that could be captured in musical notation.  
In reaching its verdict on this basis, the court was privileging music that could be 
notated in respect of the dominant values of white western art music (melody, 
chord sequence and structure, and the semantic understandings of lyrics – those 
aspects identified by Bennett in his critique), rather than in respect of the 
aesthetic qualities valued in much African America music (rhythm, feel, timbre, 
texture, lyrical and vocal gesture). In discriminating in this way between what 
was to be valued for the purposes of copyright, the ‘Blurred Lines’ case, Fink 
(2015) suggested, was informed by a racial politics and history of appropriation, 
and that it offered:  
a way to punish an unsympathetic pair of defendants and right, at least by 
proxy, a whole history of unfair appropriation … Not only did Thicke and 
Williams embarrass themselves in court, they did it against Marvin Gaye, 
perhaps the tragic example of how African-Americans have struggled for 
artistic freedom within a music industry built on the systematic 
exploitation of their labor and creativity 
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Read like this, copyright brings into play a broader awareness of the history of 
appropriation within a political economy of African American music.  
 Also implicated in the ‘Blurred Lines’ case - and copyright more generally 
– is the further question of what constitutes a ‘work’ – that which may or may 
not be copied (Pila, 2010). The answer to this is also a matter of politics. As 
Mireille Van Eechoud (2014: 163) notes: ‘The work concept … causes law to 
favour scored music over improvisation, melody over harmony and rhythm, to 
give author-composers more power than performers.’  In other words, court 
interpretations of copyright law serve to recognize particular forms of music and 
to distribute rewards to specific actors (composers) in acknowledgement of their 
skills (and hence, not to recognize other musical forms, performers and skills).9  
 The legal construction of the work and of  originality are not bound  by 
ordinary language understandings of terms such as ‘novelty’ or ‘innovation’ or 
indeed ‘creativity’.10  ‘Original’ refers only to the act of originating something, 
irrespective of its finer qualities (or lack thereof).11 All that is required to 
determine whether something has been copied depends on matters of ‘similarity’ 
and ‘access’. The first concerns the resemblance between two works; the second 
involves the question of whether the defendant had access to the copied work. 
Both issues are tested in court, but where everyday understandings of originality 
                                                        
9 A football match does not qualify as a work for the purposes of copyright, 
according to the CJEU, because the game is determined by its rules, and therefore 
does not allow for ‘creative freedom’ on the part of the players (individually or 
collectively) (Van Gompel, 2014: 100).  
10 French IP law, for example, provides no definition of ‘originality’; whereas UK 
law is silent on ‘creativity’. 
11 Judicial notions of ‘originality’ tend to combine Romanticism with a narrowly 
understood labour theory of value (Barron, 2006; Lutticken, 2002). 
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do not apply, ‘common sense’ is used to determine whether copying has 
occurred..  
Juries or judges decide whether ‘in human experience’ it is possible that 
‘the two works could have been independently created.’ The courts ask whether 
a ‘reasonable juror could find substantial similarity of ideas or expression’ or  
‘whether the ordinary, reasonable audience’ would see substantial similarity in 
the ‘total concept and feel of the works’ (Loomis vs Cornish, US District Court, 
Central District of California, CV12-5525 RSWL(JEMx)).  And judges rule as to 
whether or not the use of the same words or images in two songs was a 
coincidence; that is, the unavoidable consequence of a shared, common culture 
(Peters vs West, No. 11-1708, 7th Circuit, 20012).12  In short, judgements as to 
whether copying has occurred depends on appeals to the notion of an ‘ordinary’ 
and ‘reasonable’ jury or audience, or to the idea of a ‘common culture’. These 
might be seen as appeals to principles of democratic justice, but they depend on 
the highly contestable notion of what is ‘normal’ or ‘common’.13  
Just as courts create rules and methods for defining what is ‘original’ in a 
‘work’, they also establish narratives of creativity, determining who is 
responsible for the original contribution. There is a tendency to assume a single 
originating author, discounting the possibility of collective creativity (Barron, 
2006; Bently, 2009; Free, 2002). 
                                                        
12 The case involved Kanye West, and one issue was whether the phrase ‘what 
does not kill you, makes you stronger’, which featured in the song, was in 
common usage. 
13 Decisions of this type are not exclusive to the US courts, but the determination 
of copyright abuse varies considerably across jurisdictions.  
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 This assumption has generated a long history of court cases in which 
members of bands have gone to court in pursuit of the claim that they made an 
original contribution to the success of those groups, but were not justly 
acknowledged or rewarded for that contribution.14  Courts are required to 
determine who has made ‘an original contribution to the Work’ (Fisher vs 
Brooker, 2006, para 42).  In the making of such judgements, the idea of 
originality can become unhitched from its neutral understanding, and become 
instead freighted with political values and perspectives.  As Jane Gaines (1991: 
12) argues: ‘Judicial discourse … will hold forth on the strict legal definition of 
“original work” as nothing more than a work produced by an originator. But it 
may then abruptly lapse into value judgements that betray preference for elite 
culture’s dismissal of anything that is “imitative” or genuinely “original”.’  In the 
case that Gaines has in mind, it was not the words of a song (and their 
‘originality’) that was at issue. It was a matter of whether a vocal style deserved 
copyright protection. The singer Nancy Sinatra brought a case in which she 
claimed that her vocal mannerisms were being deliberately and illegitimately 
imitated in an advertisement. Her claims to her own sound and style were being 
infringed. Sinatra saw copyright law as a way of protecting her integrity and 
identity.  
The court decided otherwise. Sinatra’s vocal style was not deemed to be 
‘property’ to be owned by, in this case, the singer (Gaines, 1991: 115). 
Duplication is prohibited, it was decided; imitation is not (Gaines, 1991: 121). For 
                                                        
14 They include Procul Harum, The Smiths, Barclay James Harvest, The Bluebells, 
and Spandau Ballet.  
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Gaines (1991: 9), the law’s understanding of ‘likeness’ set limits to ‘the available 
pool of expressive gestures’. It did so on the basis of  a particular account of 
property rights.  And implicit in Gaines’ criticism of the decision was an 
alternative understanding of the relationship between art and the artist. Rather 
than being a matter of property ownership, art was to be seen as an extension of 
the person. 15  
The issue of ownership also arose in the ‘Blurred Lines’ trial, where Robin 
Thicke’s attorney argued that ‘no one owns a genre or a style or a groove’ 
(quoted in Brown, 2015).  Insofar as the finding of the court was that a style 
could be plagiarized, Fink (2015) argued that the payment awarded to  Marvin 
Gaye’s estate entailed the monetizing of  ‘black creativity’, and provided 
‘intellectual justification for fencing off more of our shared heritage of sounds, 
grooves, vibes, tunes and feels from the people who need it most’.16  This is not 
necessarily a critique of copyright as such, but rather a recognition that the 
decisions made in its name have wide-ranging cultural and political significance.  
Creativity is not a product of an unfettered imagination, but of a shared 
culture and of a regulatory regime (Negus and Pickering, 2004). Indeed, Jon 
Elster (2000) contends that creativity depends on working within the constraints 
imposed upon it, rather than on ignoring or defying them. It entails borrowing 
                                                        
15 It is important to note, however, that there are instances where a performer’s 
right to their distinctive style is protected, as was demonstrated in cases 
involving Tom Waits and Bette Midler. The protection afforded, though, derives 
from rights of ‘publicity’, not copyright (Demers, 2006: 59-67).  Our thanks to 
one of  our Political Studies’ referees for this point.  
16 Similar concerns have been expressed about how the extension of the 
copyright term to 70 years has made much cultural heritage unavailable and 
inaccessible (Heald et al., 2015)  
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and playing with the styles adopted by others, and copyright can either facilitate 
or hamper this process. As Stef Van Gompel (2014: 112) argues:  
Copyright law recognizes creative constraints imposed by rules of genres 
in literature, film, visual arts, music, and so on, insofar as ‘style’ is 
excluded from protection. This means that authors are free to use the 
shared characteristics of form, content, style, or mood of existing genres, 
as long as they refrain from copying the original expression of specific 
works within those genres.  
So where Gaines sees the need to protect ‘style’ in the name of individual 
integrity, Van Gompel argues that ‘style’ represents a common resource for a 
democratic culture. What are being contested here are not just the conditions of 
creativity, but the definition of originality and what it represents.  These matters 
touch, as we have seen, on notions of property and individual integrity, and on 
assumptions about what marks ‘originality’ and how responsibility might be 
attributed.  They raise questions of racial and cultural politics, and of identity, 
individuality and generic or stylistic convention.    
 
Sampling and the politics of copying 
The politics implicated in copyright come into especially sharp focus when we 
consider the example of sampling, the re-use of recorded elements of musical 
works to create a new work.  Sampling might seem to be a practice of minor 
aesthetic or cultural detail, but not only is it a widely used musical technique 
(with equivalents in other cultural forms, including literature and film), but it too 
engages with a complex politics of ownership, discrimination and cultural rights. 
While it varies with jurisdiction, the law on sampling has been established over 
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time, in response to the technology that has made it an increasingly easy and 
more common creative technique. The 1980s are seen as a ‘golden age’ of 
sampling, when the law was unformed and those responsible for administering it 
were either ignorant or indifferent. This changed in the 1990s, when the need to 
get permission for samples became – effectively – mandatory (McLeod and 
DiCola, 2011: 20-35).   
In the new order, according to Kembrew McLeod and Peter DiCola (2011: 
16; see also Arewa, 2006), copyright law served to ‘discriminate[s] against 
sampling.’  What this means is that the freedom to borrow allowed for by (US) 
copyright law – the right to parody, to make cover versions, to mimic a style – 
does not extend to ‘fragments of sound recordings’ (McLeod and DiCola, 2011: 
16).  Thus, those who use this particular creative form are restricted in ways that 
other artists are not. As a result, writes Martin Scherzinger (2014: 176), 
‘copyright law applies unevenly to different musical genres, often tinged with an 
ethnically inflected bias’.  Yin Harn Lee (2015) draws a similar conclusion, based 
on a systematic review of sampling cases in the US and Europe. The courts have, 
she contends, made the creative use of samples either difficult or prohibitively 
expensive. It is difficult both because the granting of a licence may be matter of 
‘whim’ on behalf of the right holders.  It is expensive because fees for samples 
may range from $100 to $10,000.  The result is a restriction ‘on users’ exercise of 
their creativity’ (Lee, 2015: 124; see also Jacques, 2016 and Vaidhyanathan, S., 
2003). 
‘ Two US court decisions in particular, argues Lee (2015: 125), ‘have 
created a bright-line rule that effectively precludes all such sampling, regardless 
of the quantity or quality of the samples taken’. In one of these cases – involving 
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a sample of Gilbert O’Sullivan’s ‘Alone Again (Naturally)’ – the judge branded 
sampling as ‘theft’ or ‘stealing’. No allowance was made for the fact that sampling 
was widely practiced and might be deemed a legitimate ‘art form’ (Theberge, 
2004: 151).  In the second case – involving the hip hop group NWA – the court 
determined that ‘substantial similarity’ was not relevant. To take a copyrighted 
extract was an offence in itself, even if it was then transformed (by looping, pitch 
control and other manipulation techniques) out of all recognition.17  While 
almost all musical traditions have depended upon creative borrowing, the law on 
sampling had an especially adverse effect on those who borrow in this particular 
way.  
But the politics of sampling do not just lie with the restrictions imposed 
on those who sample but also on those who are sampled. David Hesmondhalgh 
(2006) takes the case of the musician Moby and his album Play. This extremely 
successful record – each track of which became a soundtrack to an advert – 
sampled music from a range of artists, especially African American ones.  While 
Hesmondhalgh (2006: 54) declares himself sympathetic to the claim that 
copyright law has unjustly hampered the creativity of samplers, he draws 
attention to the ‘complex cultural politics’ involved.  One aspect of these politics 
is  the effect of borrowing – in the form of a sample – on ‘more vulnerable social 
groups’ and the possibility of ‘unethical borrowing practices’ (Hesmondhalgh, 
2006: 55 & 57).  Hesmondhalgh argues that Moby’s use of samples is an example 
of an unethical appropriation that serves to advance Moby’s interests, and to 
                                                        
17 There are signs that the law is changing on this, becoming more relaxed in 
what it prohibits, albeit to the advantage of established stars. See VMG Salsoul vs 
Madonna Ciccone, 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, June 2016, D.C. Case No: 2:12-cv-
05967-BRO-CW 
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efface those of whom he samples. Hesmondhalgh is not claiming that anything 
illegal or underhand was done; the samples were licensed and the right holders 
compensated.18 His point is that this compensation fails to acknowledge a more 
profound injustice.  
Against this charge, Barry Shank (2014) weighs in the balance the 
pleasures to be derived from Moby’s use of African American voices. These 
pleasures constitute the songs’ ‘political force’, and this latter ‘cannot be 
canceled by claims of appropriation, no matter how accurate those claims may 
be.’ (Shank, 2014: 37).  Whatever Shank means by music’s ‘political force’, his 
argument with Hesmondhalgh derives from essentially contested claims about 
culture and cultural heritage, about individual integrity, and about the conditions 
of creativity and the morality of copying.  To this extent, their debate serves to 
underline the political stakes in copyright, stakes that, as we show in the next 
section, are confronted and resolved by musicians in their working lives.  
 
Making music, making claims 
In focusing on the pronouncements of courts and policy-makers, and in building 
on our claims about the politics of copyright from these, there is a danger that we 
overlook the routine practices and understandings of those who are most 
directly involved in the process. It is one thing to examine the principles which 
copyright embodies and the interpretations put upon them by the courts, it is 
quite another to suggest that this is how creativity and originality are lived.   
                                                        
18 Although the beneficiary may not be the artist if they do not hold the 
copyright. 
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We know from experimental evidence that the value placed on 
intellectual property does not conform straightforwardly to the assumptions 
made by those who posit rational economic actors (Buccafusco and Sprigman, 
2010). But if they do not fit the standard economic model, how do musicians and 
others see copyright and its relationship to their creative practices? We report 
here on interviews conducted with musicians and others in the music industry in 
which their attitudes to, and perceptions of, copyright, creativity, originality and 
copying were explored.19 
Musicians and songwriters readily acknowledge that they learn their craft 
through imitation.20 This was true of those we spoke to, and of those interviewed 
by others (Rachel, 2013; Zollo, 2003; musician, personal interview, 28 January 
2014). Musicians as diverse as Mick Jones of The Clash and the avant-garde 
composer John Cage have admitted that their work leaned heavily upon that of 
others (Perrett, 2014).  Musicians admit that copying was either an expectation 
of their employment or was a product of an ever more demanding workload 
(songwriter and producer, personal interview, 20 March 2014). ‘In the olden 
days,’ one musician (personal interview, 6 October 2014) told us, ‘if I came up 
with a tune that sounded a bit like something else, I would dismiss it instantly.  … 
but now, slowly, and just through sheer demand, because I have to write a song a 
week and produce it and get it out, because that’s the business … I never 
consciously rip anything off ….It’s copying but it’s not plagiarism as such… music 
has always been a progression about people learning from each other.’  It is 
                                                        
19 We conducted semi-structured interviews with twenty-five professional 
musicians, songwriters, managers and producers.  
20 As one of our referees noted, the same may not apply to other cultural forms – 
comedy, for example, where convention holds that jokes are not to be stolen.  
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possible to read into this answer the anxieties and dilemmas that songwriters 
experience, and how they justify their relationship to the work of others. The law 
plays a very minor, even non-existent, part in these deliberations, but a 
judgement evidently is present. Another musician explained how they felt on 
being told that their song sounded very like one by another well known 
musician: ‘As soon as they said it, it was like, “Yes, it is, isn’t it?” We ummed and 
ahhed, but it was different enough, we felt, to not have to worry about him 
coming in touch but it’s normally like that. ... We don’t consciously copy.’ 
(personal interview, 26 August 2014) One songwriter told us that learning by 
copying was just ‘lazy’ (personal interview, 28 March 2014), while The Eagles’ 
Don Henley described copyists as vandals who ‘go into a museum and paint a 
moustache on somebody else’s painting’ (Michaels, 2014).  The fact of these very 
different views serves only to emphasise that ‘copying’ is not a straightforward 
matter, either practically or ethically (Gripsrud, 2014).  
‘Copying’ invites at least two discrete sets of consideration. One is about 
obligations to others – typically, other musicians. This requires respecting their 
work and their right to claim authorship. The other is about creativity, about 
claiming originality for one’s own work: ‘our ethos really is that we want to try 
and do something completely new’ (musician, personal interview, 26 August 
2014).  But being ‘original’, making ‘new’ sounds, is not straightforward. One 
musician put it like this: ‘Even if I’ve taken a big chunk of the music they’ve 
composed, I've done something to it to make it not their idea anymore, you 
know.’ (personal interview, 18 December 2013)  It can vary with genre or form. 
Improvising jazz musicians expect to ‘quote’ from others (personal interview, 25 
January 2014).  Session musicians, paid to produce a particular sound, do not 
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claim ‘ownership’ of the sound they make; but if they are asked to ‘compose’ a 
tune, then the relationship changes, as does the expected reward and recognition 
(Session musicians, personal interviews, 22 March 2014 and 29 October 2013).  
The dilemmas around creativity and credit also emerge in the context of 
collective work. Attributing copyright to an individual or to a group has real 
resource implications, and decisions about whether to share credit are political 
ones, about which those in the music industry are very sensitive (manager, 
personal interview, 22 April 2014; musician, personal interview, 14 March 
2014).  These dilemmas become more acute and significant when large sums of 
money are involved. One musician spoke of how he lost £500,000 in a court case 
over who had contributed to the writing of a hit song (personal interview, 12 
January 2015). 
Running through these responses to the dilemmas with which musicians 
and others deal is the notion of ‘fairness’.  Individuals talk about the need for 
fairness in respect of rewards and recognition (NeYo, 2015); those who 
represent the collective interests of artists and their publishers speak of ‘fair 
rules and fair regulations’ (CISAC, 2015); and those who responded to the EU’s 
consultation on copyright policy wanted to see a more fair system (Dobusch, 
2014). How ‘fairness’ is understood varies, but it always entails a political rights 
claim. This means something very different to the terms in which the standard 
business model identifies IP rights. Indeed, it is striking how little the law, and 
the copyright regime in particular, features in the interviews we conducted 
(where we were talking explicitly about ‘copying’). The musicians claim 
ownership and they acknowledge that they copy and crib, but in doing so they 
sound more like citizens negotiating conflicting political and moral codes, than 
 27 
legal clients registering claims or business people identifying revenue streams. 
Their working practices are further evidence of the political character of copying 
and copyright. This argument does not just apply as a contrast to the business-
based account of rights, it also applies for those like Lawrence Lessig and others 
who wish to minimize the role of copyright. As Ethan Plaut (2015: 4; see also, 
Sibley, 2015: 53) points out, the Lessig approach overlooks ‘what of the self – not 
only labor, but also elements of one’s identity – inheres in cultural products’. It is 
not a relationship of ownership. They do not see themselves as ‘owners’ of their 
art, but rather they see their art as coterminous with their identity and integrity.   
  
Conclusion 
This article has argued that copyright and copyright policy deserves more 
attention than it has so far received from political science. Our argument has 
been that copyright is of political importance in two general ways.  First, because 
of copyright’s economic role, policy has implications for the distribution of 
resources and rewards. This distribution is determined by both the interests of 
stakeholders and the political principles to which copyright appeals. These 
principles appeal to more than straightforward property rights claims, and their 
enactment entails a range of other values and judgements, and may result in 
forms of discrimination. To this extent, copyright policy contributes to politics as 
the collective rules by which we live. More than this, though, we have contended 
that copyright gives shape to ideas of individual integrity and of cultural 
expression, and perhaps most significantly to ideas of creativity and originality 
upon which liberal theory draws, but rarely examines in practice.  
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As a form of knowledge regulation, copyright builds upon widely accepted 
views that all forms of originality and creativity depend on borrowing and 
imitation, and that copyright policy in principle and practice adjudicates 
politically acceptable and unacceptable forms of copying. What matters is how it 
does this and whose interests are served in the process.  
Copyright law is not just about the distribution of the money that derives 
from creative work. The law instantiates certain values; it constitutes a moral 
order. Similarly, the law serves to regulate market transactions that also encode 
a morality (Sandel, 2012). This is clearly the case with copyright where ideas of 
authorship and originality are key. The writer Cory Doctorow (2014: 153) has 
argued that ‘money can’t be the sole determinant of whether copyright is 
working’, adding that: ‘I think we can tell a good copyright system from a bad 
one by what kind of work gets made under its rules’. Our argument, while 
echoing the tenor of these claims, would add a qualification to Doctorow’s 
statement: ‘We can tell a good copyright system from a bad one by what kinds of 
political principle inform its rules, how decisions are made, and what interests are 
recognized in the process.’   
The business of being ‘original’ is not simply a matter of formal legal 
definition, but the result of a complex interplay of lobbying, legal interpretation 
and everyday practice, among many other factors. Understanding this is 
important to understanding how one vital aspect of the modern economy 
operates and the role that policy and the political process plays in it. But, we 
would like to suggest, there is more entailed. In constituting notions of 
originality and creativity, copyright is not just serving to organize the creative 
industries. It is also serving to construct a particular understanding of 
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‘originality’, which, as we mentioned at the beginning, occupies a central place in 
notions of the liberal human subject.  
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